

















                                                 
* Anick Bosmans is Assistant Professor of Marketing at Tilburg University, Marketing 
Department, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands (A.M.M.Bosmans@uvt.nl, tel. 
+31.13.466.83.15, fax. +31.13.466.83.54). Luk Warlop is Professor of Marketing at the 
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Leuven, Belgium (Luk.Warlop@econ.kuleuven.ac.be, tel. 
+32.16.32.69.41, fax. +32.16.32.67.32). The authors are grateful to Davy Lerouge for insightful 





How Vulnerable Are Consumers to Blatant Persuasion Attempts? 
 
We show that subtle environmental elements – such as background music – can reduce 
skepticism and decrease consumers’ use of persuasion knowledge. In four studies we show that 
the presence of background music can result in increased distraction and increased inclination to 
follow salespeople’s advice. Remarkably, this effect persists even when the ulterior motive of the 
salesperson is made extremely salient. Our results suggest that consumers may be more 





Consumers are often confronted with mixed marketing signals. Marketing communications may 
contain sincere and diagnostic information to help the consumer make optimal choices, but may 
also reflect the ulterior motive of manipulating choice for profit, or sometimes even mere 
deception. In a retail setting, the salesperson’s advice may reflect a sincere recommendation, or it 
may reflect a persuasion attempt that is driven by his commission fee. For the consumer, making 
the right purchase decision is not an easy task. Consumer welfare requires that consumers faced 
with persuasive communication can extract diagnostic information and can discount persuasion 
attempts driven by mere ulterior motives.  
  Surprisingly little consumer research has investigated when and how consumers will 
discount for manipulative marketing influences. Using a scenario study, Campbell and Kirmani 
(2000) have provided evidence that unless marketers’ motives are inscrutably ambiguous, 
consumers are well able to discount manipulative or deceitful attempts. This would imply that in 
general, consumers can easily resist misleading influences. From the perspective of consumer 
welfare – this is good news. However, this fairly optimistic conclusion seems at odds with both 
the extensive literature on the remarkable efficiency of interpersonal influence techniques (e.g. 
Cialdini and Goldstein 2004) and the many known cases brought to regulatory bodies 
documenting manipulative and misleading commercial practices. 
  We argue that previous work on persuasion knowledge may have overstated consumers’ 
ability to discount manipulative persuasion attempts. More specifically, we show that subtle 
environmental elements – such as background music – can prevent consumers from applying 
their persuasion knowledge. In four studies we show that background music can lead to an 




extremely blatant. Hereby we extend the current persuasion knowledge literature in at least two 
important ways. First, we show that the ability to discount deceptive influence attempts not only 
depends on whether consumers have access to relevant persuasion knowledge or whether the 
ulterior motive is sufficiently salient, but also on the presence of subtle environmental elements, 
which may disrupt comprehension and / or deliberation of the (deceptive) advice. Secondly, we 
show that consumers are more vulnerable to persuasion attempts than is usually assumed in the 
persuasion knowledge literature and that influence attempts can be successful even when the 
attempt is extremely blatant. In addition, we argue that the overestimation of consumers’ ability 
to deal with persuasion attempts may be explained by the fact that prior studies have exclusively 
focused on participants’ reactions to scenarios, and not – as in the present research – on their 
reactions to actually experienced marketing tactics. As a result, previous studies may have 
measured consumers’ theories about how to deal with persuasion attempts, and not as much their 




Consumers’ Persuasion Knowledge 
 
  Consumers can resist misleading persuasion attempts by relying on acquired knowledge 
about marketer influence attempts (Campbell and Kirmani 2000; Friestad 1995; Friestad and 
Wright 1994; Wright 2002). Persuasion knowledge reflects what consumers know about the 
persuasive attempts of advertisers and marketers and includes beliefs about underlying motives, 




beliefs about ways to deal with these attempts. People learn about persuasion in many ways: 
From firsthand experiences in social interactions with friends and family, from observing 
persuasion agents, and from media and governmental campaigns.  
  Persuasion knowledge acts as a schema: It guides consumers’ attention to various aspects 
of an advertisement campaign or sales presentation, and it provides inferences about the agent’s 
underlying motives. It also provides further information about how to cope with the persuasion 
attempts. For example, when a consumer starts to have doubts about the salesperson’s sincerity, 
he may decide to leave the store without further listening to the sales talk, or he can decide to 
start a discussion and try to get a good deal either way. 
  A number of experimental studies have demonstrated consumers’ ability to make 
inferences about persuasion attempts. In the field of advertising, Campbell and Keller (2003) and 
Kirmani (1997) have shown that increased advertisement repetition leads to more negative 
thoughts and to heightened consumer skepticism. Whereas moderate levels of repetition signal 
product quality (consumers perceive repetition as costly and infer the company’s commitment to 
the product), higher levels of advertisement repetition are perceived as excessive expenditures 
which results in doubts about the manufacturer’s confidence in product quality. Similarly, 
consumers’ perception of high advertisement costs, leads to increased criticism and doubts about 
the product quality (Kirmani 1990; Kirmani and Wright 1989).  
 
Correcting for Persuasive Attempts 
 
  From the perspective of consumer welfare, insight into when and how consumers apply 




influence attempts is highly relevant. Surprisingly however, little consumer research has 
addressed this issue.  
Campbell and Kirmani (2000) suggest that inferences about persuasion motives are 
influenced by how accessible these motives are in consumers’ memory. Accessibility refers to 
how easily a mental construct (such as persuasion knowledge) is activated from memory (Higgins 
and King 1981). This ease of retrieval is influenced by factors such as: consumer expectations, 
the strength and intensity of the association between ulterior motive and consumers’ persuasion 
knowledge, and the frequency of activation of the ulterior motive (Campbell and Kirmani 2000). 
One can expect that, during a sales encounter for example, the motive of influencing consumers 
in order to make a sale and / or increasing one’s commission fee will be relatively accessible 
because the sales context is likely to activate one’s persuasion knowledge. Correspondingly, 
Sujan, Bettman, and Sujan (1986) have found that consumers are more likely to associate 
clothing salespeople with a focus on selling the product rather than with a focus on satisfying 





  The literature reviewed above suggests that, in general, consumers will be well able to 
resist or discount manipulative persuasive attempts. During sales encounters for example, the 
sales context by itself is likely to activate one’s persuasion knowledge, increasing consumers’ 
awareness of possible influence attempts. Hence, the mere confrontation with a salesperson is 




This optimistic assumption seems to contradict findings obtained in the interpersonal 
persuasion literature (for a review, see for example Cialdini and Goldstein 2004), where a variety 
of influence tactics have been described that all successfully lure people into a deceptive 
persuasion attempt. Examples of these tactics include the foot-in-the door technique (Freedman 
and Fraser 1966), the door-in-the face technique (Cialdini 1975), the that’s-not-all tactic (Burger 
1986), and the low-ball technique (Cialdini et al. 1978). These tactics may be explicit – such as 
the direct request to comply with an “unrefusable offer” – or implicit – such as an advertisement 
summing up all the benefits of a given product. In all these cases however, consumers explicitly 
recognize that they are being urged to respond in a desired way.  
  The extensive evidence for the success of these influence tactics suggests that consumers 
may be more vulnerable to persuasion attempts than is generally assumed by the persuasion 
knowledge literature: consumers may know that they are influenced in a certain marketing 
situation, but may not always use this knowledge when they make judgments and choices. In the 
present paper we show that even when consumers’ persuasion knowledge should be highly 
accessible – because they are confronted with a blatant persuasion attempt – subtle environmental 
cues can prevent consumers from applying their knowledge to the situation. More specifically we 
argue that environmental distraction, such as background music, can moderate the effect of 
accessibility on consumers’ use of persuasion knowledge.  
 
Environmental Distraction, Working Memory, and Use of Persuasion Knowledge 
 
  Several streams of research have shown that background music can have detrimental 




1989). For example, error rates in a memorization task increase when vocal or instrumental 
background music is playing (Salamé and Baddeley 1989). In addition, background music can 
impair comprehension of brand information that is presented in commercials (Olsen 1997). This 
disturbance in performance – caused by task-unrelated auditory elements – is explained by a 
disruption of resources used by the verbal component of the working memory system (Baddeley 
and Hitch 1974). The working memory system is assumed to consist of three components: the 
central executive, the phonological loop, and the visuo-spatial sketchpad (Baddeley 1986). The 
central executive controls information input and is responsible for planning, controlling and 
information-verification of input received from two subordinate systems. The first subordinate 
system, the phonological loop, is hypothesized to retain and process verbal and auditory 
information, while the second subordinate system, the visuo-spatial sketchpad, processes spatial 
information such as images and representations. Resources of these three subsystems are limited. 
Background music is assumed to disrupt task performance because it disturbs performance of the 
verbal component of working memory – the phonological loop. Hence, the more attention 
background music receives, the more it will interfere with ongoing verbal processing and the 
more likely it will distract ongoing information processing (Kellaris, Cox, and Cox 1993). 
  We argue that in order to infer a deceptive intent from a salesperson’s advice consumers 
need to possess the necessary resources to interpret the (deceptive) advice as well to formulate 
counterarguments. As a result, disruptions of the verbal component of working memory are 
assumed to decrease the likelihood that consumers will correct for manipulative influence 
attempts. Hence, we expect that subtle auditory cues, such as background music, can disrupt 




  Our assumption that a disturbance of working memory capacity can influence consumers’ 
inferences about salient persuasion attempts is consistent with persuasion knowledge literature’s 
notion that the application of persuasion knowledge is a resource demanding higher inference 
process (Campbell and Kirmani 2000; Gilbert, Pelham, and Krull 1988). Whereas making 
inferences on the basis of observed behavior is assumed to be an automatic process (“this 
salesperson is really nice”), adjusting these inferences for additional situational influences 
(“salespeople are nice and friendly because they want to increase sales; does this salesperson 
have an ulterior motive?”) is assumed to require an essential amount of cognitive capacity. 
Indeed, Campbell and Kirmani (2000) observed that when their participants were cognitively 
“busy” (i.e., when they had to perform other simultaneous and cognitive demanding tasks), they 
evaluated the salesperson as more sincere compared to when they were not cognitively “busy”. 
Hence, decreases in cognitive resources will decrease the likelihood that consumers will use their 
persuasion knowledge making a judgment or choice. 
  However, we extend persuasion literature in two ways. First, we show that disruptions of 
working memory capacity can prevent application of consumers’ persuasion knowledge even 
when the ulterior motive is extremely salient. As argued before, persuasion knowledge literature 
suggests that as long as salespeople’s ulterior motives are salient (as is the case in most sales 
contexts), consumers are well able to correct for possible influence attempts. In contrast, we posit 
that working memory capacity moderates the effect of accessibility on consumers’ use of 
persuasion knowledge and that disruptions of consumers’ capacity can hinder use of persuasion 
knowledge even when the persuasion knowledge is believed to be highly accessible. Second, we 




background music – can decrease the likelihood of applying one’s persuasion knowledge when 




  In this first study we examine whether background music can lead to decreased use of 
persuasion knowledge when participants are confronted with a blatant ulterior motive.  
The persuasion knowledge literature assumes that consumers’ life-long experiences 
provide them with ample abilities to react to persuasion attempts. We propose that under normal 
(and presumably optimal) conditions, individuals’ coping capability is maximal and will lead 
them to discount blatant persuasion attempts. 
We expect that the more attention background music receives, the likelier its disruption of 
working memory capacity, and the likelier its interference with consumers’ use of persuasion 
knowledge. Music’s ability to engage listeners’ attention refers to the activation potential of the 
music sound (Kroebel-Riel 1979) and can stem from objective properties such as speed and 
loudness (Berlyne 1974; Kellaris, Cox, and Cox 1993). As such, we assume that fast music will 
be more distracting for working memory capacity than slow music, and will be more likely to 
interfere with consumers’ use of persuasion knowledge. 
More specifically we expect that – consistent with persuasion knowledge literature –
participants will generally follow the advice of a salesperson when there is no salient ulterior 
motive, and correct for manipulative attempts whenever the ulterior motive becomes salient. In 
the latter condition however, we propose that the likelihood that consumers will correct for 





Participants, Procedure and Design 
 
  Participants were 116 undergraduate students who participated on a volunteer basis in a 
scientific study that was ostensibly sponsored by a market research institute. The design was a 2 
Background Music (Fast vs. Slow) x 2 Salience of the Ulterior Motive (Not Salient vs. Salient) x 
2 Promotion (Promoted Brand vs. Not Promoted Brand) mixed subjects design.  
  The apparent purpose of the study was to test consumers’ taste evaluations of two foreign 
brands of lemonade presumably to be introduced soon in the local market. They were presented a 
cup of each lemonade brand, and were asked to evaluate both of them. The two cups were almost 
similar with regard to their taste. To “facilitate their evaluation”, the experimenter always told 
that she preferred brand X (e.g., “Trendy Orange”) over brand Y (e.g., “Flight Lemonade”), 
“because of its natural taste”. To control for brand effects, preference instructions were 
counterbalanced across brands. As such, Promotion (Promoted Brand vs. Not Promoted Brand) is 
a within-subjects factor. 
  As argued before, music’s ability to attract a listener’s attention corresponds with its 
activation potential (Kellaris, Cox, and Cox 1993; Kroebel-Riel 1979) and can be manipulated by 
varying its speed (Berlyne 1974). Correspondingly, we manipulated Background Music (as a 
between-subjects factor) by varying the number of beats of otherwise identical melodies: 30 
Beats per Minute (BpM) for the low distraction condition, and 170 BpM for the high distraction 
condition. In two separate pre-tests we tested whether fast versus slow background music induces 
a) different levels of activation and b) different levels of distraction. In a first pre-test (N = 40), 
we observed that participants associated the fast music with higher activation levels than the low 




Music (i.e. fast vs. slow music) would disturb the verbal component of participants’ working 
memory, we conducted a second pre-test (N = 29) in which we asked participants to solve as 
many anagrams as possible in a time period of 5 minutes. While participants solved the 
anagrams, either the fast or slow music was playing in the background. If our fast music would be 
more disruptive for the verbal component of working memory than our slow music, we should 
observe that participants will spend more time per correctly solved anagram in the former 
condition. This was indeed the case: reactions times per correctly solved anagram were higher 
when participants were exposed to the fast music condition (M = 8.28 seconds) compared to the 
slow music condition (M = 6.41 seconds): t(27) = 2.63, p = .01 (analysis performed on log-
transformed reaction times). 
  In order to manipulate salience of the ulterior motive the experimenter either wore a T-
shirt of the promoted brand (Salient condition), or she wore an unrelated neutral T-shirt (Not 
Salient condition). Note that the experimental setting was ambiguous with regard to commercial 
purpose. Participants were told that it was a scientific study, sponsored by a market research 
institute, but they were left uncertain and uninformed about its real purpose. We expected that 
without the branded T-shirt, the experimenter’s recommendation would be seen as a sincere 
advice. In contrast, when the researcher wore a T-shirt of the brand that she recommended, the 
ulterior motive of the research (influencing consumers’ perceptions and preferences towards one 
of the brands) would become salient. 
  The dependent variable was evaluation of both the promoted and the non-promoted brand 
on five 9-point items (ranging from –4 to +4) labelled: good / bad, like / dislike, fresh / musty, 







Insert figures 1a and 1b about here 
 
 
  Figures 1a and 1b show evaluation scores as a function of Promotion of the brand and 
Salience of the ulterior motive for the slow versus fast Background Music condition respectively. 
A 3-way ANOVA was performed with Background Music and Salience as between-subjects 
factors and Promotion as within-subjects factor. We observed a strong main effect of Promotion 
F(1, 112) = 18.45, p < .001). Evaluations of the promoted brand were significantly higher than 
evaluations of the non- promoted brand (M = .93 vs. M = .40). This means that in general, the 
experimenter was able to influence participants. The only other significant effect was a 3-way 
interaction (F(1, 112) = 4.22, p < .05). Accordingly, we analysed both simple 2-way interactions.  
  In the slow Background Music condition, we observed a near to significant interaction 
between Salience and Promotion (F(1, 112) = 3.55, p = .06). When the ulterior motive was not 
salient, evaluations of the promoted brand were more positive than evaluations of the non-
promoted brand (M = .94 vs. M = .15; F(1, 112) = 11.74, p < .001), suggesting that participants 
did follow the experimenter’s advice. However, when the ulterior motive was made salient, no 
difference was found between evaluations of the promoted and the not promoted brand (M = .65 
vs. M = .48; F < 1), suggesting that participants did not follow the advice of the experimenter. 
In the fast Background Music condition, we did not observe an interaction between 
Promotion and Salience (F(1, 112) = 1.07, p > .30). Consistent with expectations, the observed 
main effect of Promotion (F(1, 112) = 10.19, p = .001) suggests that – regardless of the salience 









Consistent with the persuasion knowledge literature we found that consumers were less 
likely to follow the salesperson’s advice when an ulterior motive was made salient compared to 
when it was not. This finding was only observed when the tempo of the background music was 
slow. When fast (and more distracting) background music was played, we observed that 
participants continued to follow the experimenter’s advice – regardless of the salience of the 
ulterior motive. These results suggest that fast music prevents people from applying their 
persuasion knowledge – even when the ulterior motive becomes salient. Hence, whereas 
Campbell and Kirmani (2001) showed that people always apply their persuasion knowledge 
when the ulterior motive is made salient, we show that in a real consumption choice setting, use 
of persuasion knowledge is hindered by the presence of subtle environmental cues (such as fast 
background music), even when the ulterior motive is highly blatant. 
  One problem of the present study is that we did not control for effects of our background 
music on participants’ mood states. Our fast music condition could have brought people in a 
positive mood state, whereas our slow music condition could have brought people in a more 
negative mood state (or vice versa). Since we did not control for these possible mood effects, we 
cannot exclude the possibility that our observed effects were driven by mood. Since positive 
mood is associated with a heuristic and less systematic processing mode (e.g. Mackie and Worth 




have been less suspicious about the ulterior motive. In our second study we attempt to exclude 




  The purpose of this second study is twofold. First, we want to rule out the alternative 
explanation that our observed effects in the previous study are due to mood effects. Therefore we 
manipulate background music that is as much free of content as possible: the ticking of a 
metronome. We assume that manipulating background music by varying the speed of the 
metronom ticks affects participants’ level of attention and distraction, but not their mood states. 
In order to further exclude a mood explanation, we will manipulate consumers’ pre-existing 
mood states. Hence, if it is the level of attention and distraction that influences consumers’ use of 
persuasion knowledge, we should observe decreases in use of persuasion knowledge as a function 
of tempo of the background music, regardless of participants’ pre-existing mood states.  
A second purpose of this study is to look at consumers’ real choice behavior. It is possible 
that participants in our previous study merely followed the advice of the experimenter because 
they had nothing to loose. In this study we measure participants’ real choice behavior by giving 
them the opportunity to take home a sample of the brand that they prefer. Hence, actual choices 
for the blatantly promoted brand would be a stronger indication that persuasion knowledge was 
not applied. 
 





  Participants were 70 undergraduate students who participated on a volunteer basis. As in 
the previous study, they were asked to participate in a scientific study that is ostensibly sponsored 
by a market research agency. The design was a 2 Background Music (Slow vs. Fast) x 2 Mood 
(Positive vs. Negative) by 2 Promotion (Promoted Brand vs. Not Promoted Brand) mixed-
subjects design. 
  Importantly, we made the ulterior motive salient in each of these conditions. This was 
done as in the previous study: The experimenter wore a T-shirt of the brand that was promoted. 
As in the previous study, we assumed that the T-shirt should make the experimenter appear more 
suspicious. 
  The procedure was identical to the one used in the first study, except for the fact that 
subjects were first brought in the intended mood state (hence, mood was a between subjects 
factor). Participants were told that the psychology department of the university was working on a 
“Life Event Inventory”, and was still looking for positive (in the Positive Mood condition) or 
negative (in the Negative Mood condition) life events. They were then given 5 minutes time to 
report on one such specific, recently experienced positive or negative life event (see also Bless et 
al. 1996). This part of the study was ostensibly unrelated to the remaining of the study (tasting 
lemonades), and was conducted in a different experimental room. 
  Unlike in study 1 we manipulated background music by manipulating the tick frequency 
of a metronome. We chose for metronome ticks because we believed that it was a content-free 
form of distraction manipulation, i.e. unrelated to mood. In our slow Background Music 
condition there were 25 ticks per minute, whereas in fast Background Music condition there were 
110 ticks per minute. A pre-test showed that both manipulations differed with respect to 




(t(79) = .22, p > .50). As before, we wanted to assure ourselves that our manipulation (i.e. fast vs. 
slow background music) would disturb the verbal component of working memory. As in study 1 
we found that reactions times per correctly solved anagram were higher when participants were 
exposed to the fast music condition (M = 8.23 seconds) compared to the slow music condition (M 
= 6.99 seconds): t(44) = 2.33, p < .05 (analysis performed on log-transformed reaction times). 
  As in study 1, we measured evaluations of both the promoted and the not promoted brand. 
The same 5 bipolar items were used. In addition, we also measured participants’ real choice 
behavior. At the end of the experimental session participants were given the opportunity to take 




Insert figures 2a and 2b about here 
 
Evaluation Scores. Figures 2a and 2b display evaluation scores of the promoted and not 
promoted brand as a function of Background Music and Mood. A 3-way ANOVA was performed 
with Background Music and Mood as between-subject factors and Promotion as a within-subjects 
factor. The significant main effect of Mood revealed that overall, evaluations were more positive 
under conditions of positive compared to negative mood (M = .70 vs. M = .27, F(1, 66) = 5.79, p 
< .05). In addition, the main effect of Promotion showed that evaluations for the promoted brand 
were more positive than evaluations for the non-promoted brand (M = .69 vs. M = .28, F(1, 66) = 
6.56, p < .05). More interestingly however, a significant 2-way interaction was found between 
Background Music and Promotion: F(1, 66) = 4.46, p < .05. None of the other effects were 




In our slow Background Music condition no significant effects were found. Neither the 
main effects (both p’s > .29), nor the interaction effect between Mood and Promotion reached 
significance (F < 1). As expected, because the ulterior motive was salient, no difference between 
the promoted and not promoted brand was found (F < 1): neither in the positive mood condition 
(M = .68 vs. M = .60; F < 1) nor in the negative mood condition (M = .40 vs. M = .34; F < 1) did 
participants follow the advice of the experimenter.  
In our fast Background Music condition, both a main effect of Promotion (F(1, 66) = 
10.52, p = .001) as well as a main effect of Mood was found (F(1, 66) = 5.40, p < .05). Overall, 
evaluations were more positive when people were in a positive mood state compared to in a 
negative mood state (M = .77 vs. M = .16). More importantly, and consistent with expectations, 
no interaction effect was found between Mood and Promotion (F < 1). In both the positive as 
well as in the negative mood condition, participants were more inclined to follow the advice of 
the experimenter, even when the ulterior motive was salient (for the positive mood condition: M 
= 1.05 vs. M = .48, F(1, 66) = 2.87, p = .09, marginally significant; in the negative mood 
condition: M = .61 vs. M = -.28, F(1, 66) = 8.54, p < .01). 
 
Insert figure 3 about here 
 
Choice Behavior. A logistic regression analysis was performed on the binary choice data (1 if 
participants’ choice was similar to the promoted brand, 0 if else). Background Music and Mood, 
as well as their interaction effect were included in the model (-2LL = 80.73;  ² = 13.48, p < .01). 
Percentages of choices for the promoted brand are shown in figure 3. We observed a significant 
main effect of Background Music (B = 1.75, p < .05). None of the other effects were significant 









Our results are consistent with those of study 1, and show that fast background music 
decreases consumers’ application of persuasion knowledge. These effects are not due to 




  The results of the previous two studies suggest that fast background music prevents 
consumers from discounting blatant persuasion attempts. Instead, consumers seem to be 
influenced by the superficial recommendation of the salesperson. 
  Note however, that our manipulation of salience of the ulterior motive was never overtly 
and unambiguously misleading, and not all participants may have noticed the experimenters’ 
promotional T-shirt. As a result, our manipulations may have been too weak in order to evoke 
real skepticism.  
  The purpose of the present study was to make our manipulation of salience of the ulterior 
motive much stronger, thereby creating a condition in which the ulterior motive of the 
experimenter is very obvious. If our assumptions with regard to the effects of environmental 




would expect a similar failure to discount blatant persuasion attempts when this attempt is 
unambiguous and extremely blatant. 
  The design was similar to the one employed in study 1, instead for the incorporation of a 
condition in which we made the ulterior motive of the experimenter extremely blatant: Besides 
wearing a T-shirt of the promoted brand, he also wore a promotional cap, and pretended to call 
the national sales representative about the “promotional campaign” and the delivery of the 
“promoted lemonade”. 
 
Participants, Design, and Procedure 
 
  Participants were 163 undergraduate students. They were led to believe that a market 
research company sponsored this study. Participants were rewarded with a free movie ticket for 
participation. 
  The design was a 2 Background Music (Slow vs. Fast) x 3 Salience of the Ulterior Motive 
(Not Salient, Low Salient, Highly Salient) by 2 Promotion (Promoted vs. Not Promoted) full 
factorial mixed-subjects design. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions. 
  The procedure was identical to that of study 1, except for the additional inclusion of a 
Highly Salient condition. In this condition, the experimenter did not only wear a T-shirt of the 
promoted brand (as in the Low Salient condition), but also a cap with a large inscription of the 
promoted brand. Moreover, the experimenter pretended to make a phone call to the national 
sales-representative shortly after she expressed her own brand preference: “Yes hello, this is the 
sales-representative of the Western part for [promoted brand]. Yes [promoted brand]. I’m still 




it still coming? - … - OK, thanks!”. In the other two Salience conditions (Not Salient and Low 
Salient) the call was neutral: “Yes hello, it’s me. I just wondered whether all arrangements have 
been made with regard to our removal truck - … - OK, thanks! I’ll talk to you later!”.  




Insert figures 2a and 2b about here 
 
  Figures 4a and 4b display mean evaluation scores as a function of Salience and 
Background Music. A 3-way ANOVA was performed, but only the main effect of promotion was 
significant (F(1, 157) = 26.70, p < .001). However, given our specific hypothesis (that can not be 
tested with overall tests), and given the strong effects obtained in our previous studies, we 
performed specific planned comparisons (Rosnow and Rosenthal 1995).  
In our slow Background Music condition, we observed only a significant difference 
between the promoted and the non promoted brand when the ulterior motive was not salient: F(1, 
157) = 6.60, p = .01 (M = 1.42 vs. M = .96). As expected, in this condition the advice of the 
experimenter was considered as sincere advice. In the other two conditions, where the ulterior 
motive was salient, we expected the advice to be considered as manipulative and deceptive, and 
participants were expected not to follow the advice of the experimenter. Consistent with this, in 
both the low salient as well as the highly salient condition, no difference was found between the 
promoted and the not promoted brand (for the low salient condition: M = 1.25 vs. M = 1.00, F(1, 
157) = 1.64, p > .20; for the high salient condition: M = 1.18 vs. M = .96; F(1, 157) = 1.50, p > 




Different results were obtained for the fast Background Music condition. Here, 
participants were inclined to follow the given advice irrespective of the salience of the ulterior 
motive. In all conditions, the promoted brand was evaluated significantly better than the not 
promoted brand (F(1, 157) = 8.40, p < .01, M = 1.42 vs. M = .88 [not salient condition]; F(1, 157) 
= 4.06, p < .05, M = 1.14 vs. M = .75 [low salient condition], and F(1, 157) = 7.44, p < .01, M = 




Again, evidence was found that a subtle cue such as background music can prevent 
consumers from discounting manipulative persuasion attempts. In addition, and interestingly, 
even when the ulterior motive is extremely salient and blatant, participants seem to take the 




  The aim of this study was twofold. First, the results of the previous 3 studies indicate that 
consumers are extremely vulnerable to manipulative persuasion attempts: even a subtle 
environmental cue such as background music is able to decrease consumers’ use of persuasion 
knowledge, making them more receptive for extremely blatant persuasion attempts. Consumer 
welfare would benefit from knowledge about variables that can eliminate the effects of 
environmental distracters on use of persuasion knowledge. One such variable might be 




In the present study we manipulate consumers’ processing motivation by making them 
more (or less) accountable for their decision. Since processing motivation is generally considered 
to increase the consumers’ focus on the presented message, one can expect that highly motivated 
consumers will be more focused on the (deceptive) message, and therefore less likely to be 
distracted when applying their persuasion knowledge. As a result, we propose that the disrupting 
influence of background music will cease to exist when participants are highly motivated to 
process the message content. Consistent with this expectation, Olsen (1997) observed that the 
disruptive effect of background music decreased as participants’ motivation to process the ad 
content increased (i.e., a goal-oriented vs. incidental learning condition). We therefore expect that 
when motivation (accountability) is high, fast background music will not interfere with the 
application of persuasion knowledge, whereas when motivation (accountability) is relatively low, 
background music continues to disrupt application of persuasion knowledge. 
  Secondly, in our previous studies, we mainly focused on a comparison between 
evaluations of the promoted versus the not promoted brand. Because we manipulated salience of 
the ulterior motive by increasing the presence of promotional material, the results obtained in our 
previous studies may reflect consumers’ sensitivity to promotional material and not – or to a 
lesser extent – the intended application of persuasion knowledge. For example, fast background 
music may have resulted in a more peripheral processing mode (Chaiken 1980; Petty and 
Cacioppo 1986), thereby making consumers more sensible to the presence of promotional 
material. In order to exclude such an alternative explanation, and in order to provide a more 
convincing argument for decreased use of persuasion knowledge as a result of fast background 
music, we now focus on participants’ skepticism scores. Decreased use of persuasion knowledge 




In study 4 we therefore not only measured consumers’ preference for the promoted over the not 
promoted brand, but also their skepticism towards the experimenter. If our hypothesized effects 
can indeed be ascribed to decreased use of persuasion knowledge, we should observe that fast 
background music not only increases participants’ decreases the level of consumer skepticism 
when the ulterior made is highly salient. When consumers are highly motivated, no such effects 
are expected. 
 
Participants, Design, and Procedure 
 
  A total of 104 undergraduate students participated in this study in order to fulfil course 
requirements. As in the previous studies, participants were led to believe that a market research 
company sponsored the study. 
  The design was a 2 Background Music (Slow vs. Fast) x 2 Salience of the Ulterior Motive 
(Not Salient vs. Highly Salient) x 2 Motivation (Low vs. High) full factorial between-subjects 
design.  
  The procedure was identical to that used in studies 1 and 3 (only the highly salient 
condition). In addition, motivation was manipulated by giving specific task instructions before 
participants entered the experimental room. An independent experimenter provided instructions 
that made participants either high or low accountable for their evaluation and preference. In the 
high motivation condition, the following instructions were given: “The university and a market 
research company are performing a study about foreign lemonades. We are interested how the 
local market would react to these lemonades. It is important to think careful about your opinion, 




university’s restaurant. The university newspaper will publish an article about this drink, and 
there is a considerable chance that the newspaper will ask for your interview after this session.” 
In the low motivation conditions, only the first two sentences were given to participants.  
Consumer skepticism was measured on three seven-point items (ranging from 1 to 7). 
Participants were asked to indicate their opinion about the experimenter: misleading / sincere, 
manipulative / informative, and I approve / I disapprove (  = .69). 
 
Consumer Skepticism Results 
 
Insert figures 5a and 5b about here 
 
Mean scores on consumer skepticism are displayed in figures 5a and 5b. Lower scores reflect 
lower levels of consumer skepticism. A 3-way ANOVA was performed with Background Music, 
Salience and Motivation as between subjects factors. A marginally significant main effect of 
Motivation was obtained, suggesting that participants were somewhat more skeptical in the high 
motivation compared to the low motivation condition (M = 3.37 vs. M = 3.01, F(1, 96) = 3.05, p 
= .08). In addition, a marginally significant 2-way interaction between Background Music and 
Salience was found (F(1, 96) = 3.50, p = .06). More interestingly, and as expected, we obtained a 
significant 3-way interaction between Background Music, Salience, and Motivation: F(1, 96) = 
6.01, p < .05). No other effects were significant (all p’s > .23). Below we will report the 
evaluation results for each motivation condition separately. 
  When motivation was low, the 2-way interaction between Background Music and 
Salience was again significant (F(1, 96) = 8.08, p < .01). When distraction of background music 




when it was blatant (M = 2.73 vs. M = 3.75, F(1, 96) = 5.49, p < .05). In contrast, when 
distraction of background music was high, participants were somewhat less skeptical when the 
ulterior motive was salient versus when it was not (M = 2.39 vs. M = 3.17, F(1, 96) = 2.86, p = 
.09, marginally significant). 
  When motivation was high, again no significant effects were observed: neither the main 




As expected consumers were found to be more skeptical towards the experimenter when 
the ulterior motive was made salient compared to when it was not. This effect however 
diminished when fast (distracting) background music was played. These results confirm our 
suggestion that even subtle background music is able to prevent consumers from applying their 
persuasion knowledge and to decrease their skepticism even when the ulterior motive is highly 
salient. Our results also suggest that being highly motivated and accountable for ones decision 




  Our results question whether successful coping with persuasion attempts is as common as 
is suggested by the persuasion knowledge literature. In Campbell and Kirmani’s (2000) study for 
example, consumers were found to be well able to discount the deceptive persuasion attempts 




an attempt preceded a purchase appeared sufficient to cue participants to the ulterior motive of 
the sales person. Campbell and Kirmani’s results are based on participants’ reactions to scenarios, 
and as such may reflect consumer theories on how they should cope with persuasion tactics rather 
than their actual reactions in such circumstances. Our studies however tested the extent to which 
consumers apply their persuasion knowledge in response to an actually experienced marketing 
tactic. The results of our 4 studies suggest that Campbell and Kirmani’s results may have 
overstated consumers’ ability to discount for manipulative persuasion attempts, and may not be 
generalizable to real life consumer experiences. Our participants were faced with a probably 
unexpected and blatant attempt to influence their preferences. Also, the cue to ulterior motives 
was blatant and impossible to ignore. Appropriate discounting only occurred when the 
environmental conditions were optimal and when there was no interference of fast distracting 
background music. Even a subtle cue, such as fast background music, was able to prevent people 
from resisting to deceptive persuasion attempts.  
  We argue that the disruptive influence of background music on consumers’ use of 
persuasion knowledge is caused by the fact that background music depletes resources of the 
verbal component of working memory (Olsen 1997; Salamé and Baddeley 1989) that is also 
assumed to be taken up by the use of persuasion knowledge. As our results suggest, the faster the 
tempo of the background music, the more likely it will interfere with consumers’ use of 
persuasion knowledge. In the present research we focused on the disrupting influence of auditory 
environmental elements. An interesting suggestion for further research would be to look at the 
possible disrupting influence of visual environmental elements such as moving images or 




  A possible alternative explanation for our results may be that distracting background 
music does not actually decreases consumers’ use of persuasion knowledge and their skepticism, 
but instead lowers their ability to process the message in general and puts them in a more 
peripheral processing mode. As a result, they may have been more persuaded by peripheral 
elements such as the presence of promotional material (we manipulated salience of the ulterior 
motive by increasing the presence of promotional material) (Chaiken 1980; Petty and Cacioppo 
1986). The skepticism results obtained in our fourth study however refute this alternative 
explanation and suggest that distracting background music not only affects mere evaluations of 
promoted versus not promoted products but also consumers’ level of skepticism towards the sales 
encounter. 
  From a welfare perspective our results may induce some pessimism about consumer 
vulnerability. Our results show that consumers are often not able to resist or ignore an even 
blatant persuasion attempt. We are well aware of the fact that, from an ethical perspective, our 
results have far going implications with regard to consumer exploitation. However, our results 
also show that increasing consumers’ involvement and commitment to the purchase situation (or 
increasing ones motivation in general) is the best way to resist blatant and misleading persuasion 





FIGURES 1a and 1b 
Mean Brand Evaluations as a Function of Salience of the Ulterior Motive for the Slow and Fast 
Background Music Conditions 
Figure 1a 
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FIGURES 2a and 2b 
Mean Brand Evaluations as a Function of Mood for the Slow and Fast Background Music  
Figure 2a 
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Percentage of Choices for the Promoted Brand as a Function of Mood 
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FIGURES 4a and 4b 
Mean Brand Evaluations as a Function of Salience of the Ulterior Motive for the Slow and Fast 
Background Music Conditions 
Figure 4a 
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FIGURES 5a and 5b 
Mean Skepticism Scores for the Promoted Brand as a Function of Background Music for the Low 
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